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Comeau and Constitutional
Interpretation
Hoi L. Kong*
R. v. Comeau1 raises questions about the place of originalism in the
interpretation of a federalism provision of the Constitution Act, 1867,2 as
well as related issues about the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, in
anticipation of the Supreme Court’s hearing of the case, Léonid Sirota
and Benjamin Oliphant wrote in the postscript to their 2017 article
entitled “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional
Jurisprudence”: “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision … may well provide
welcome clarifications as to [the] value and importance of originalist
reasoning in Canada”.3 They argued that the case posed a question that
represented “‘the biggest single challenge facing originalists’ — whether
and how to ‘reconcil[e] originalism with precedent’”4 that deviates from
the original meaning of a constitutional provision. When understood in
these terms, Comeau engaged a broad academic debate about the
relationship between living tree constitutionalism and originalism that is
ongoing in Canada, the United States and elsewhere.
In this article, I will argue that the general commitment of Canadian
courts to living tree constitutionalism does not rule out a place for
originalism in the interpretation of the division of powers. We shall see
that the Supreme Court drew upon originalist methods in Comeau when
*
The Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., UBC Professor in Constitutional Law, Peter A. Allard
School of Law, University of British Columbia. For outstanding research assistance, I thank Adrian Pel and
Ryan Brown. I am grateful for insightful questions from participants at the 2019 Osgoode Constitutional Cases
Conference and from participants in a seminar on living tree constitutionalism held at the Tokyo Institute of
Technology in October, 2018. That seminar was sponsored by the KAKEN study group: “Living Tree
Doctrine?” and I am particularly grateful to Professor Takashi Shirouzu of Chiba University’s Law School for
the invitation and his colleagues for an enlightening discussion. Finally, the comments received through the
anonymous peer review process greatly assisted me in sharpening this article’s arguments.
1
[2018] S.C.J. No. 15, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Comeau”].
2
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
3
Léonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional
Jurisprudence” (2017) 50 UBC Law Review 505, at 576 (citations omitted) [hereinafter “Sirota &
Oliphant, ‘Originalist Reasoning’”].
4
Id.
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reading and applying section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The
Court’s treatment of precedent in Comeau did not, however, definitively
resolve the question of what should happen in the case of a conflict
between a court’s understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning
and settled precedent, nor did the reasons in the case settle the question
of what should be the appropriate relationship between originalism and
living tree constitutionalism in Canadian constitutional interpretation.
I will conclude that the Court in Comeau evidenced an eclectic approach,
and I will suggest why that approach can be justified.
The article will proceed in three Parts. Part I will describe the Court’s
reasoning in Comeau. Part II will introduce some current positions in
debates about the relationship between originalism and the living tree
doctrine in Canadian constitutional interpretation, as well as some
theoretical debates about originalism and living tree constitutionalism.
Part III will argue that Comeau interprets section 121 in ways that are
consistent with the “original public meaning” version of originalism,
although the decision does not resolve the question of what would
happen in the event of a direct conflict between a court’s understanding
of the original meaning of a constitutional provision and settled
precedent with respect to that provision. The article will further note that
some passages of the Court’s decision express living tree constitutionalist
values and that the relationship between these values and originalist ones
is unresolved in the case. It will conclude by arguing that this lack of
resolution is characteristic of an eclectic approach to constitutional
interpretation and that eclecticism is justified because it does justice to
the range of values that are at play in the practice of constitutional
interpretation.

I. PART I : COMEAU AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Mr. Comeau, who was the respondent at the Supreme Court of
Canada, argued that provisions of New Brunswick’s Liquor Control Act5
violated section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which states: “All
Articles of the Growth, Produce or Manufacture of any one of the
Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of
the other Provinces.” According to the respondent, section 134(b) of the
Liquor Control Act offended section 121 because that provision of the
Constitution “prevents the Province of New Brunswick from legislating
5

R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-10.
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that New Brunswick residents cannot stock alcohol from another
province”.6 In finding in favour of Mr. Comeau, the trial judge departed
from long-standing precedents and did so “on the basis of historical and
opinion evidence tendered by an expert witness”.7
At issue in the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada were two
questions: “First, did the trial judge err in departing from precedent, and
second, what is the proper interpretation of s. 121?”8
The Court introduced the first issue by setting out the trial judge’s
reasoning. According to the Court, the trial judge accepted “(1) [an]
expert’s description of the drafter’s motivations for including s. 121 in
the Constitution Act, 1867, and (2) [that] expert’s opinion that those
motivations drive how s. 121 is to be interpreted”.9 Based on this
evidence, the trial judge held that a line of precedents, beginning with
Gold Seal Ltd. v. Attorney General for the Province of Alberta10 had been
incorrectly decided. That decision held that “s. 121 prohibits direct tariff
barriers (i.e., custom duties) on goods moving between provinces”.11 By
contrast, the trial judge reasoned that the expert’s evidence on the
legislative history and on the political climate at the time indicated that
“in the minds of the drafters [the phrase “admitted free” in s. 121] …
meant barrier-free borders”.12 The trial judge concluded that this new
evidence fell within an exception to vertical stare decisis set out in
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford.13
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred. The
Court reasoned that the evidence before the trial judge did not fall within
the Bedford exception, which states that evidence must meet “the
threshold of fundamentally shifting the parameters of the debate”14 in
order for a lower court to be able to revisit binding precedent. The Court
held that
[b]ecause the historical evidence accepted by the trial judge is not
evidence of changing legislative and social facts or some other
fundamental change, it cannot justify departing from vertical stare
6

Comeau, at para. 4.
Id., at para. 6. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s application
for leave to appeal. The Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (paras. 21-22).
8
Id., at para. 7.
9
Id., at para. 36.
10
[1921] S.C.J. No. 43, 62 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.).
11
Comeau, at para. 14.
12
Id., at para. 16.
13
[2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.).
14
Comeau, at para. 43.
7
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decisis. While one’s particular collection of historical facts or one’s
view of that historical evidence may push in favour of a statutory
interpretation different from that in a prior decision, the mere existence
of that evidence does not permit the judge to depart from binding
precedent.15

The Court supported this conclusion with some observations about
the Privy Council’s reasoning about the living tree approach to
constitutional interpretation set out in Edwards v. Canada (Attorney
General)16 and stare decisis. The Court noted that by being “limited
entirely to the words and context of the provision in light of the historical
evidence”, the trial judge’s interpretation of section 121 was at odds with
the purposive approach set out in Edwards and followed by a long line of
cases.17 The Court further held that the trial judge’s reliance on the
expert’s opinion about the correct interpretation of section 121 was an
error because constitutional interpretation is within the core competence
of judges and to rely on the expert’s opinion on this kind of matter was
“to cede the judge’s primary task to an expert”.18 According to the Court,
if courts were to rely on expert opinion in this way, they would
undermine the very purposes of stare decisis, as such reliance would
introduce an unmanageable degree of instability into the law.19
On the second issue raised by Comeau, namely the proper
interpretation of section 121, the Court concluded:
… s. 121 prohibits governments from levying tariffs or tariff-like
measures (measures that in essence and purpose burden the passage of
goods across a provincial border); but s. 121 does not prohibit
governments from adopting laws and regulatory schemes directed to
other goals that have incidental effects on the passage of goods across
provincial borders.20

The Court arrived at this conclusion by analyzing the historical and
legislative context of section 121, the unwritten constitutional principle
of federalism, and the case law interpreting that section. In its
examination of the historical context, the Court looked at trends and
events, including declining British preferences for Canadian exports by
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id., at para. 37.
[1930] A.C. 124, 1929 U.K.P.C. 86 [hereinafter “Edwards”].
Comeau, at para. 39.
Id., at para. 40.
Id., at para. 41.
Id., at para. 53.
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185021 and the United States’ abrogation in 1866 of the Reciprocity
Treaty which had “mimicked the provinces’ earlier access to British
demand”.22 In response to these events, the framers of the Constitution
Act, 1867 “agreed that individual provinces needed to relinquish their
tariff powers”.23 The Court examined legislative debates, and in light of
these, noted that the framers chose the broader, more ambiguous phrase
“admitted free” rather than “a narrower phrase like ‘free from tariffs’”.24
Based on its assessment of the historical materials, the Court concluded
that section 121 “prohibits the imposition of charges on goods crossing
provincial boundaries”, that there was no evidence suggesting that
provinces would “lose their power to legislate under s. 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 for the benefit of their constituents, even if that
might have impacts on interprovincial trade”, and that there was limited
historical support for the view that the section guaranteed “trade free of
all barriers”.25
In examining the legislative context of section 121, the Court
considered (1) sections 122 and 123, which address the shifting of
customs and excise levies from the provinces to Parliament, (2) Part VIII,
which includes sections, including section 121, that impose “direct
burdens on the price of commodities”,26 and (3) the placement of section
121 in the Constitution Act, 1867, relative to sections 91 and 92. After
assessing this legislative context, the Court concluded that section 121
was part of a scheme that enabled the shifting of customs, excise, and
similar levies from the former colonies to the Dominion; that it should
be interpreted as applying to measures that increase the price of goods
when they cross a provincial border; and that it should not be read so
expansively that it would impinge on legislative powers under ss. 91
and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.27

The Court then read section 121 in light of the principle of federalism,
citing Reference re Securities Act28 for the proposition
that both federal and provincial powers must be respected and one
power must not be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id., at para. 57.
Id., at para. 58.
Id., at para. 62.
Id., at para. 64.
Id., at para. 67.
Id., at para. 71.
Id., at para. 73.
[2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.).
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another. Rather, federalism demands that a balance be struck, a balance
that allows the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to act
effectively in their respective spheres.29

In coming to its conclusion about how an interpretation of section 121
could arrive at an appropriate balance, the Court referred to the living
tree doctrine, noting that the doctrine “is not an open invitation for
litigants to ask a court to constitutionalize a specific policy outcome. It
simply asks that courts be alert to evolutions in, for example, how we
understand jurisdictional balances and the considerations that animate
it”.30 The Court considered interpretations of section 121 that argued in
favour of full economic integration31 or of giving provincial governments
“expansive scope to impose barriers on goods crossing their borders”.32
In rejecting both of these interpretations, the Court concluded that the
appropriate federal balance would be struck by a rule that
prohibits laws directed at curtailing the passage of goods over
interprovincial borders, but allows legislatures to pass laws to achieve
other goals within their powers, even though the laws may have the
incidental effect of impeding the passage of goods over interprovincial
borders.33

The Court supported this understanding of the text of section 121 with
its reading of the relevant precedents and articulated a test for
determining whether a law infringes the provision. According to that test,
a court first asks “whether the essence or character of the law is to
restrict or prohibit trade across a provincial border”.34 If the law does not
do this, section 121 is not engaged.35 However, “[i]f it does, the claimant
must also establish that the primary purpose of the law is to restrict
trade”.36 If the primary purpose of legislation is directed at a valid
provincial goal and only incidentally restricts interprovincial trade, it will
be found to be valid.37
The Court applied this test to the impugned provisions of the Liquor
Control Act (including section 134(b)) and concluded that by making it
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Comeau, at para. 79.
Id., at para. 83.
Id., at para. 85.
Id., at para. 87.
Id., at para. 88.
Id., at para. 108.
Id., at para. 111.
Id.
Id., at para. 112.
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an offence to obtain liquor from a source other than the New Brunswick
Liquor Corporation, the Act did impede interprovincial trade, but its
primary purpose was the valid one of “restrict[ing] access to any nonCorporation liquor, not just liquor brought in from another province”.38
Did the Court in Comeau clarify the place of originalism in Canadian
constitutional interpretation and did it specify what should happen should
a binding precedent conflict with a novel judicial interpretation of the
original meaning of a constitutional provision? We have seen above that
the Court addressed arguments about the intentions of the drafters of
section 121, interpreted the provision in light of its historical and
legislative context, as well as the principle of federalism, and constructed
a two-part doctrinal rule. We saw further that in its consideration of the
exception to vertical stare decisis, the Court referred to Edwards, the
classic citation for the living tree doctrine in Canadian constitutional law.
In the next Part, I will provide context for the Court’s analysis by
examining some recent writing on originalism, both from Canada and
elsewhere. That discussion will enable us to see that the doctrine of the
living tree can be understood to be consistent with a particular version of
originalism. Once we understand the nature of that consistency, we will
see in Part III how Comeau was also an example of a specific form of
originalist reasoning, although that case contains passages that suggest a
commitment to living tree constitutionalist ideas. I will conclude Part III
by arguing that the Court did not provide a definitive answer to the
question of how a court should respond to a conflict between the
Constitution’s original meaning and a well-established precedent, and
that in its acceptance of diverse interpretive sources, the Court evidenced
an embrace of eclecticism.

II. PART II: ORIGINALISM IN CANADIAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
Léonid Sirota, Benjamin Oliphant, Bradley Miller and others have
made valuable contributions to our understanding of originalism’s place
in Canadian constitutional law.39 Miller, in an important chapter
challenging the conventional understanding of the constitutional
38

Id., at para. 122.
See, e.g., Benjamin Oliphant & Léonid Sirota, “Has the Supreme Court of Canada
Rejected ‘Originalism’?” (2016) 42 Queen’s Law Journal 107 [hereinafter “Oliphant & Sirota,
‘Originalism’”] and Bradley W Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors: The Living Tree and Originalist
Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22:2 Can. Journal of Law & Juris. 331 [hereinafter
“Miller, ‘Beguiled’”].
39
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metaphor of the living tree, situates Edwards40 in contemporary theories
of originalism.41 I focus on Miller’s work because it provides an
excellent entry point into debates about originalism and because it
has influenced how recent scholarship has approached originalism in
Canada.
Miller argues that the Privy Council rejected a specific form of
originalism espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons in that
case.42 That form of originalism focuses on how a Constitution’s drafters
intended that a constitutional provision should be applied. Miller
describes the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the relevant
provision in the following terms: “the object of the inquiry was not about
the framers’ intentions with respect to the semantic meaning of ‘persons’,
but rather their intentions about application meaning; that is, how would
they have answered the concrete question ‘does section 24 of the BNA
Act permit women to be appointed to the Senate?’”43
1. Original Public Meaning Originalism in Edwards
The notion of framers’ intentions is central to a version of originalism
that goes by the name “original intentions originalism”.44 Standing opposed
to this version is another — original public meaning originalism — which
focuses on the “plain meaning of the text”.45 According to Miller, the
Privy Council adopted this latter version of originalism when it
interpreted section 24 of the British North America Act (“BNA Act”).
Miller notes that when interpreting the meaning of the word “person”,
the Privy Council looked to “(1) ‘external evidence derived from
extraneous circumstances such as previous legislation and decided
cases’, and (2) ‘internal evidence derived from the Act itself’”.46 Miller
argues that in so doing, the Privy Council aimed to ascertain not the

40

Edwards, supra, note 16.
Bradley W. Miller, “Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New
Originalism” in Grant Huscroft & Bradley W Miller, eds. , The Challenge of Originalism: Theories
of Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 120 [hereinafter
“Miller, ‘Origin Myth’”].
42
Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1928] S.C.R. 276 (S.C.C.).
43
Miller, “Origin Myth”, at 125 (citations omitted).
44
Id., at 128.
45
Id., at 134.
46
Id., at 131.
41
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intentions of the framers, but rather the plain or original public meaning
of the provision, and this “semantic meaning” was “fixed as of 1867”.47
How can we reconcile this reading of Edwards with the case’s status
in Canadian constitutional law as the classic source of “living tree
constitutionalism”? Miller argues that a careful reading of the case
reveals that “the Privy Council did not state that the BNA Act is a living
tree, but that the BNA Act planted a living tree”.48 The living tree then, is
not the BNA Act itself, but rather the Canadian Constitution as a whole,
which includes usages, conventions and constitutional doctrine.
According to Miller, it is the Canadian Constitution in its entirety that is
“a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits,
and not the specific textual provisions of the BNA Act. The task of textual
interpretation is always focused on recovering the fixed, semantic
meaning of the text.”49
At this point in his argument, Miller introduces a well-known, if
controversial distinction in the writing on originalism between
“interpretation” and “construction”.50 When the act of interpreting the
original public meaning of constitutional text reveals that the text is
indeterminate with respect to a particular legal question, a court will need
to construct a rule that allows it to apply the text to the question at
hand.51 In the Edwards case, the Privy Council adopted a rule of
construction that required that the ambiguity in the word “person” be
resolved in favour of an inclusive, rather than exclusive, reading of the
term.52 According to Miller, it was this rule of construction that allowed
the Privy Council to apply the text to the question of whether women
fell within the scope of section 24 of the BNA Act and to conclude
that they did.
Miller seems to argue that for the Privy Council, the corpus of
constitutional law lying beyond the original public meaning of the
constitutional text’s provisions — a body of law that includes customs,
usages, and doctrinal rules, including rules of construction — is
47

Id., at 134.
Id., at 132.
49
Id., at 132.
50
For a recent explanation of the distinction and debates surrounding it, see Randy E.
Barnett and Evan D. Bernick, “The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism” (2018)
107:1 Geo. Law Journal 1, at 10-18 [hereinafter “Barnett and Bernick, ‘Letter’”].
51
According to Barnett and Bernick, “when original meaning was insufficient to determine
the outcome of a case or controversy, the judiciary needed to engage in constitutional construction to
supplement original meaning”, id., at 13.
52
Miller, “Origin Myth”, at 135.
48
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susceptible to evolution. By contrast, the object of constitutional
interpretation, namely the original public meaning of the text’s
provisions, is fixed at the moment when the Constitution is enacted. This
understanding of original public meaning originalism allows for
applications of the constitutional text that differ from what the
Constitution’s framers themselves would have intended. This is so, in
part, because the original public meaning version of originalism does not
concern itself with the framers’ intentions, but it is also because some
original public meaning originalists believe that courts can legitimately
develop rules of construction that apply indeterminate constitutional text
to novel circumstances.53 The challenge for these originalists lies in
determining how to limit judicial discretion when courts generate rules of
construction, since if courts were unconstrained in this exercise, the rule
of law values of settlement and certainty that are associated with
originalism would be lost.54 And since these rules of construction arise in
cases that rest on interpretations of the relevant constitutional provision,
there is the possibility that these cases, once they have become settled
precedents, will conflict with an interpretation that discloses a novel
understanding of the relevant provision’s original public meaning. It is to
a discussion of these values of settlement and certainty and the place of
precedent in the literature on originalism that I now turn.
2. Originalism in Theory: Normativity, Living Tree
Constitutionalism and Precedent
Thus far we have seen that the doctrine of living tree interpretation in
Edwards, as it has been construed by Miller, is consistent with original
public meaning originalism. I have also made passing reference to rule of
law values associated with originalism, namely those of settlement and
stability. In order to address living tree constitutionalism as an alternative
theory to originalism (and not simply a doctrine articulated in a given
case), I will aim to specify rule of law values that its proponents view as
central to the theory and show how they engage the legality-related
values that are central to originalism. Before I enter into the discussion of
living tree constitutionalism, let me clarify my understanding of the

53
Barnett and Bernick describe debates amongst originalists about the utility of the
interpretation-construction distinction in Barnett and Bernick, “Letter”, at 14-16.
54
Barnett and Bernick, “Letter”, at 17.
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normative content associated with originalism and discuss a prominent
originalist’s incorporation of certain living tree insights into his theory.
(a) Originalism’s Normativity
We have seen above that originalism is a big tent that includes
proponents of the original intentions and original public meaning
versions. Originalism’s tent includes other versions, including “original
methods originalism”, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of
this article.55 This diversity has led some commentators to conclude that
originalism is “not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional
interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories
that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single
label”.56 Solum challenges this view and claims that two central ideas
unite all originalists. According to Solum:
All or almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of the
Constitution was fixed at the time each provision was framed and
ratified. Almost all originalists agree that original meaning must make
an important contribution to the content of constitutional doctrine: most
originalists agree that courts should view themselves as constrained by
original meaning and that very good reasons are required for legitimate
departures from that constraint.57

These aspects of originalism stress the importance of settlement and
stability of law. The original meaning of the Constitution settles certain
questions of interpretation and anchors the interpretive activity of courts.
It is important to note that these rule of law values are articulated in a
context where the originalist’s interlocutors will reasonably ask that the
arguments advanced be responsive to contemporary concerns and
understandings of what a Constitution is for.58 Jack Balkin argues further
that the task of identifying the original public meaning of a given
constitutional provision requires a normative choice, and does not
55

For an overview of the many strands of originalism, see Lawrence B. Solum, “What is
Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory” (May 2, 2011) online: Georgetown
University Law Centre, online: <https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2362&context=facpub> [hereinafter “Solum, ‘What is Originalism’”].
56
Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, “Living Originalism” (2009) 59:2 Duke Law
Journal 239, at 244.
57
Solum, “What is Originalism”, at 33.
58
For a recent argument along these lines, see Jack M. Balkin, “The Construction of
Original Public Meaning” (2016) 31 Constitutional Commentary 71 at 88, 96.
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involve “simply reporting objectively and dispassionately on the facts of
the past”.59 This is so, argues Balkin, because “disputes about original
public meaning are usually more than simple disputes about facts; they
are also usually disputes about theories and normative assumptions”.60
Originalism, then, is value-laden. As a theory, it is called upon to justify
itself in normative terms to those who may not share its commitments,
and as a method, it involves making and defending interpretive choices
when, for instance, a judge identifies the original public meaning of a
constitutional provision.
In Living Originalism,61 Balkin argues that this normative aspect of
originalism further manifests itself in two related distinctions, between
principles and rules and between constitutional delegations and
constraints. He claims that when constitutional designers decide between
language that expresses one or the other of each of the terms in these
distinctions, they make a choice that has normative implications. He
writes:
we should pay careful attention to the reasons why constitutional
designers choose particular kinds of language. Adopters use fixed rules
because they want to limit discretion; they use standards or principles
because they want to channel politics through certain key concepts but
delegate the details to future generations.62

To illustrate these distinctions, Balkin contrasts open-ended terms in
the American Constitution, such as “due process” and “equal protection
of the laws”63 with more determinate language, such as the requirement
that “the president must be thirty-five years old”.64 According to Balkin,
it makes sense to interpret the former kinds of terms as expressing an
intention to articulate “a collection of key values and commitments that
set the terms of political discourse and that future generations must
attempt to keep faith with”.65 Because those responsible for designing a
Constitution “cannot prepare for every eventuality”,66 they use this kind
of open-ended language as a means of delegating to future generations
59

Id., at 81.
Id.
Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011)
[hereinafter “Balkin, ‘Living Originalism’”].
62
Id., at 6-7.
63
Id., at 25.
64
Id., at 44.
65
Id., at 25.
66
Id.
60
61
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the responsibility for developing “institutions and practices to
make politics and governance possible and successful in changing
circumstances”.67 By contrast, the more determinate language in a
Constitution can resolve specific issues that were unsettled at the
moment of a Constitution’s coming into force68 or establish institutional
features of a constitutional polity that, in Balkin’s words, are
“hardwired”, are not susceptible to meaningful debate, and thus constrain
future generations’ interpretations of them.69
Balkin argues that originalist interpretations of a Constitution must
account for this difference. To make interpretive choices that render
principles more rule-like and to imagine that the primary goal when
applying these principles is to constrain constitutional judges, is to
misconstrue the plain meaning of the text, as well as the design of the
Constitution.70 It is here that the distinctions we have seen above
between intended application and original public meaning, and between
interpretation and construction have significant purchase. According to
Balkin’s theory, if one interprets open-ended constitutional provisions
exclusively in light of evidence about how the founding generation
thought that they would be applied in specific circumstances, one does
violence to those provisions’ original meaning. That meaning is broader
than any given intended application of them, and their status as principles
and not rules forms an essential part of their original meaning. Moreover,
restricting the interpretation of open-ended provisions to their intended
application removes from future generations the power delegated to them
by the Constitution to construct such provisions in ways that are
responsive to changing circumstances. In Miller’s terms, such a
restrictive interpretation stunts the growth of constitutional usages,
conventions and doctrine, which as we have seen above, he understands
as comprising the Constitution’s living tree.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Balkin, like Miller, understands
his version of originalism to be consistent in some respects with living
tree constitutionalism and inconsistent with forms of originalism that
interpret constitutional provisions exclusively in light of how the framers
thought that they should be applied. In order to understand in what

67
68
69
70

Id.
Id., at 26.
Id., at 42.
Id., at 29.
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respects Balkin’s originalism diverges from living tree constitutionalism,
let us turn to the work of a prominent proponent of that theory.
(b) Living Tree Constitutionalism
Aileen Kavanagh argues against original intention originalism, in
terms that would be recognizable to Balkin, when she states: “a judge
claiming to interpret the Constitution must justify and explain looking to
original intention as a legitimate source of constitutional meaning.… So,
an interpretation can never be thoroughly descriptive in the way in which
originalist argument assumes.”71 As we have seen from our discussion of
Balkin’s work, this claim applies equally to original public meaning
originalism and she sets out the relevant living constitutionalist arguments.
The living tree constitutionalist claims that any instance of
constitutional interpretation must be supported by “justifying reasons”
which, Kavanagh argues, “must be advanced as part of an evaluative
framework that shows why they are relevant”.72 This justificatory project
has been framed by Ronald Dworkin as essential to the rule of law.
According to Dworkin, under conditions of disagreement about what the
Constitution requires, “[i]t must … be part of the rule of law, not merely
that all sides should obey the rules, but that they should accept some
institutional settlement of what the rules are”.73 This acceptance arises,
Dworkin argues, in response to a court’s application of “principles that
define the court’s responsibilities to hold what the legislature has done to
independent standards of policy or justice”.74 Controversial constitutional
decisions must be taken, imposed and justified, Dworkin argues, in a
spirit of humility that concedes that those who disagree with a decision
may be right, that takes seriously the opposing side’s concerns as moral
convictions and does not view them to be mere preferences, and that
offers reasons in a spirit of solicitude and not with a “winner-takes all”
mentality, which seeks to reduce those who oppose a decision to a
condition of “subservience”.75 The living tree constitutionalist thus
emphasizes a certain quality of respect for the moral agency of those
71
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subject to judicial decisions. Kristen Rundle in her writing on Fuller has
labelled this kind of respect “reciprocity”76 and Jeremy Waldron has in a
similar vein argued that the rule of law values of “orientation to the
public good” and “systematicity” respect “the dignity of reasoning and
even argumentativeness … of … individuals whose lives law governs”.77
Yet for all the emphasis that the living tree constitutionalist places on
the justificatory aspects of the rule of law, she is at pains to stress that the
interpretive powers of courts are limited. Kavanagh insists that a court
engaged in constitutional adjudication is subject to a variety of
constraints, including the fact that its interpretive activity is directed at
the Constitution and does not involve pure moral reasoning,78 and she
argues that judges are bound to make their decisions in light of “a
pre-existing legal framework and standards”,79 precedent,80 and the
norms of the legal culture81 and of an adjudicative setting.82 These
normative constraints are important because compliance with them
evinces respect for “the values of authority and continuity in law, of legal
certainty and predictability”.83 Ultimately, the living tree constitutionalist
recognizes that the boundaries of a constitutional provision’s meaning
are fixed by “the standards set out in the Constitution”.84 The living tree
constitutionalist recognizes, then, that courts are constrained by the rule
of law values primarily associated with her originalist opponent and by
the text itself. We have also seen above that Balkin recognizes that
originalist courts are obliged to justify their interpretive choices in ways
that resemble a court labouring under the justificatory requirements of living
tree constitutionalism. The difference between Kavanagh’s and Balkin’s
approaches seems to be largely one of emphasis. In order to illustrate
more concretely how the interpretive activities of the originalist differ
from those of her living tree constitutionalist counterpart, I turn to
examine how they might approach precedent and the original meaning of
constitutional text.
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(c) Originalism, Living Tree Constitutionalism, Precedent and
Constitutional Text
Precedent represents a serious challenge for originalists, Solum notes,
because if the original meaning of the Constitution (however defined)
determines its interpretation, then judicial citations to precedent when
interpreting the Constitution are either superfluous or mistaken.85 The
most difficult originalist case arises when precedent conflicts with a
court’s interpretation of the original meaning of the Constitution. Solum
has delineated a variety of pragmatic ways of dealing with such a
conflict. For instance, if adopting a correct originalist interpretation over
an incorrect precedent would result in serious institutional or political
disturbances, an originalist court may respect the precedent for a
transitional period in order to permit any political adjustments to be
made before the originalist interpretation could safely be adopted.86
Similarly, in contexts where judges are divided over approaches to
constitutional interpretation, an originalist judge may accept the validity
of precedent in a case where it clearly conflicted with the original
meaning, as a means of gaining the support of judges on the same bench
who reject originalism.87 In each instance, the pragmatic reasons act as
limits on the interpretive activities of the originalist judge, who would
otherwise, as a matter of principle, reject the precedent in question.
For the living tree constitutionalist, precedent presents a different set
of concerns. Judges in this account are obliged to arrive at an
interpretation of the Constitution that can be justified to the parties
before them, in terms that fit within an evaluative framework and in a
manner that respects their moral agency and, where necessary to do so,
an interpretation may change the law. In some circumstances, such
change occurs in order for courts to respond to changing legal and social
conditions.88 Therefore, if an earlier court’s interpretation of the meaning
of a constitutional provision is shown to be clearly mistaken in light of
the applicable evaluative framework and the evolving context, the living
tree constitutionalist judge is free to interpret the provision differently.89
According to Kavanagh, the living tree constitutionalist judge must give
85
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due consideration to precedents, and in overruling them, she must appeal
to strong, supporting reasons that would overcome the rule of law
reasons for conserving them.90 But precedent does not pose the
challenges to the living tree constitutionalist that it does for the
originalist. The living tree constitutionalist judge is limited only by
the quality of the justificatory reasons that she can offer for preserving or
overruling precedent. By contrast, the originalist when faced with
precedent makes pragmatic judgments about whether to respect it or to
uphold the original meaning of the constitution, which otherwise has
supervening value.
This contrast between the respective roles that precedent plays in
originalism and living tree constitutionalism applies even to versions of
originalism that are in some respects consistent with the living tree
approach to constitutional interpretation. A comparison of the work of
Balkin, who as we have seen, espouses this version of originalism, with
the scholarship of David Strauss, who places the issue of precedent at the
centre of his living tree theory, further reveals a difference in how they
understand the concept of constitutional legitimacy. For Balkin, the
touchstone of constitutional interpretation is the text’s original public
meaning. The fact that the Constitution is susceptible to evolution
in respect of those provisions that are framed in open-ended terms is
consistent with the original public meaning of those terms, and in
particular, their status as principles, rather than rules. Where the language
and original understanding of a constitutional provision is determinate
and was understood to be so at the time of the founding, respect for the
original meaning entails rejecting the possibility that such a provision
can be changed over time via constitutional interpretation or
construction.91
Balkin’s respect for the original meaning of the Constitution is
grounded in the importance that his theory of constitutional interpretation
accords popular sovereignty. For Balkin, the constitutional text results
from an exercise of sovereignty and is legitimate and owed fidelity
because of that fact. That fidelity is expressed when interpreters respect
the Constitution’s determinate language by not altering it.92 And fidelity
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is further expressed when interpreters exercise the authority delegated to
them by the Constitution’s open-ended provisions and offer constructions
that are responsive to changing times and circumstances.93
By contrast, a living-tree constitutionalist who prioritizes the
justificatory values associated with constitutional interpretation may, in
certain circumstances, interpret constitutional language in ways that
diverge from its plain meaning and the original understanding of that
meaning. And the underlying justification for living tree constitutionalist
interpretations lies not in respect for the sovereign authority of the
Constitution’s framers, but rather in the extent to which a given
interpretation can be justified to those who are subject to the
Constitution’s authority.
An illustration of these aspects of living tree constitutionalism can be
found in Strauss’s work on constitutional interpretation. Strauss argues
that much of contemporary American constitutional law doctrine is
simply not consistent with the original understanding of the relevant
constitutional provisions.94 The rationale for this fact and for what
Strauss calls “common law constitutional interpretation”95 is two-fold.
The first, “rational traditionalist” justification states that “one should be
very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting
reflectively, and in good faith, especially when those judgments have
been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time”.96 This rationale explains
why we should accept the considered judgments of courts who have
interpreted the Constitution over time: precedents that are the result of
processes of evolution are valued because they have been subject to
constant reconsideration and repeatedly tested against concrete
experience.97 According to Strauss, this rational traditionalist justification
for common law constitutional interpretation both explains and justifies
current American constitutional practice. Strauss argues that “[i]n
practice, constitutional law is, mostly, common law. What matters to
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most constitutional debates, in and out of courts, is the doctrine the
courts have created, not the text”.98
According to Strauss, the second, “conventionalist” rationale for
common law constitutional interpretation explains why the constitutional
text is given varying weight, depending on the nature of the dispute in
question. This rationale “suggests that, other things equal, the text should
be interpreted in the way best calculated to provide a focal point of
agreement and to avoid the cost of reopening every question”.99 The
conventionalist basis for Strauss’s common law constitutionalism
explains why the meaning of uncontroversial and determinate provisions
of the constitutional text is typically accepted at face value. He notes, for
instance, that there is no serious debate over whether the American
constitutional stipulation that the limit of a President’s term is four years
should be measured with the Gregorian, as opposed to another
calendar.100 All reasonable interpreters of the Constitution accept the
resolution of the question of how long a President’s term should be that
is offered by the plain meaning of the text. The plain meaning is accepted
because it provides this resolution, rather than out of obedience to the
framers’ authoritative exercise of sovereignty.
By contrast, in areas of significant political and moral debate, Strauss
argues, the plain meaning of constitutional text and the original
understandings of the framers have less significance. Debates are
nonetheless framed as exercises of constitutional interpretation for the
conventionalist reason that there is a general consensus in the United
States that “the words of the Constitution should count for something”.101
For instance, judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment that
extended protections offered by the Bill of Rights to the states addressed
contested questions of political morality. The “incorporation doctrine”, as
it has been developed through a line of Supreme Court cases, is not
obviously supported by the constitutional text or the framers’
understanding of that text.102 Nonetheless, what would otherwise have
been a debate over matters of pure political morality was tied by the
courts to the Constitution, and in Strauss’s words: “[t]he link to the text
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legitimated incorporation by connecting it to something everyone
believed in”.103
For present purposes, the contrast between living tree
constitutionalism and originalism turns on how each weighs the values of
settlement, certainty, stability, and sovereignty, on the one hand, and
what I label justification, on the other. I have claimed that even for an
originalist such as Balkin who accommodates much of the living tree
constitutionalist framework in his theory, this difference in weighing
yields a divergence between how he treats precedent and the original
meaning of constitutional text and how Strauss, a proponent of living tree
constitutionalism who privileges common law constitutional methods,
treats those constitutional sources.

III. PART III: PRECEDENT V ORIGINALISM: AN UNRESOLVED
DEBATE AND COMEAU’S ECLECTICISM
With this theoretical background in view, we are now in a position to
answer the question of what place the Supreme Court of Canada in
Comeau gave to originalism and precedent in its interpretation of section 121
of the Constitution Act, 1867. Given that the Court seemed to dismiss
the expert’s evidence about the framer’s intentions, which was decisive
in the trial judge’s reasons for overturning precedent, we might be
tempted to say that the Court rejected originalism. This would be a
mistake. Although the Court rejected an originalist interpretation that
focused tightly on the framer’s intentions, it undertook an analysis that
employed the interpretive strategies of original public meaning
originalism. As we have seen, the Court examined the historical and
legislative context of section 121 in order to determine its correct
interpretation and rejected what it saw as purely policy-based
arguments for alternative readings. In effect, the Court’s examination of
the historical and legislative context revealed what the provision would
have meant in 1867.
Moreover, the decision could be read as adopting the interpretationconstruction distinction that has emerged as a key component of some
theories of originalism. After undertaking its interpretation of
section 121, the Court synthesized the relevant precedents and
constructed a doctrinal test that allowed the Court to apply that provision
103
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to the facts before it. The Court’s interpretation did not seek to determine
how the framers would have applied the section. In its use of interpretive
methods associated with original public meaning originalism and in its
implicit adoption of the interpretation-construction distinction, Comeau
resembles Miller’s rendering of the Privy Council’s reasons in the
Edwards case and manifests significant aspects of Balkin’s version of
public meaning originalism.
The Court’s reasons in Comeau tell us little, however, about how it
might view the relationship between the original public meaning of the
Constitution and precedents that interpret the Constitution. This is so
because first, the Court found no conflict between what might be
considered to be the original public meaning of section 121 and
precedents that interpreted that provision. Second, although the question
of precedent’s relationship to original meaning is the subject of vigorous
debate in the academic literature in the context of horizontal precedent,
Comeau was a case of vertical precedent. Originalists recognize that if
lower courts were permitted to “impose their own view of the original
meaning of the constitutional text, the rule of law values of predictability,
certainty, stability, publicity, and uniformity would be undermined.”104
We have seen above that the Court, in its assessment of the trial judge’s
reliance on the expert evidence, expressed similar concerns. In the end,
the fact that the Court in Comeau concluded that the trial judge did not
meet the stringent standard for overturning vertical precedent tells us
little about how the Court would view the relationship between
horizontal precedent and original public meaning, particularly in cases of
conflict between the two.105
Does Comeau shed any light on the Court’s view of the general
relationship between originalism and living tree constitutionalism, and in
particular on the relative weight that the Court gives to the values that are
associated with each of these schools of constitutional interpretation?
There are hints in the reasons. First, as we have seen above, the Court
criticized the trial judge for focusing exclusively on the words and
historical context of section 121 and failing to adopt a purposive
approach to the section.106 Second, the Court invoked the unwritten
constitutional principle of federalism as a guide to interpreting
104
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section 121.107 Third, the Court invoked the living tree doctrine and
described it as “ask[ing] that courts be alert to evolutions in, for example,
how we understand jurisdictional balances and the considerations that
animate it”.108 Finally, the Court in obiter described the consequences of
adopting the interpretation of section 121 for which the respondent
advocated:
Agricultural supply management schemes, public health-driven
prohibitions, environmental controls, and innumerable comparable
regulatory measures that incidentally impede the passage of goods
crossing provincial borders may be invalid.109

Each of the first three hints suggests that the Court was willing to
invoke materials beyond those relevant to determining the original public
meaning in order to interpret the constitutional text, and each resonates
with the justificatory focus of living tree constitutionalism, rather than
originalism’s values of settlement and stability. Consider first the
invocation of purposive interpretation. Miller has contrasted a
“purposive” approach to constitutional interpretation that seeks the
“advancement of purposes or principles or policy objectives”110 with the
originalist interpretive methodology that he draws from the Privy
Council’s reasoning in Edwards. He has also argued that the canonical
statement of the purposive approach to constitutional interpretation in
R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd.111 is nuanced, begins with “the semantic
meaning of the text”112 and is in this respect consistent with originalism.
Nonetheless, argues Miller, the purposive approach “seems to be a broad
invitation to normative evaluation … undertaken with a view towards
serving the good of those who are intended to benefit from the Charter —
that is, all members of the political community”.113 Taken in the context
of Miller’s overall argument, this justificatory focus would seem to
render purposive interpretation vulnerable to the originalist’s charge that
107
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living tree constitutionalism “allows for ad hoc and unprincipled
constitutional interpretation, that it lacks the resources to discipline or
constrain its interpretations”.114 And when seen in this originalist light,
the Comeau Court’s criticism of the trial judge’s failure to adopt a
purposive interpretation can be understood as an implicit endorsement of
a living tree and non-originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Second, let us consider the Court’s invocation of the unwritten
constitutional principle of federalism in Comeau. There is a significant
body of writing on the unwritten constitutional principles in Canada, and
I do not intend to add to it here. I only want to suggest that the Court’s
invocation of the unwritten principle of federalism in Comeau can be
understood to be inconsistent with at least some forms of originalism. In
an analysis of unwritten constitutional principles, Jeffrey Goldsworthy
has distinguished what he calls genuine from spurious implications.115 He
writes: “[t]he existence of genuine implications depends on evidence of
unexpressed or partially expressed purposes, which may amount to
principles, underlying the Constitution”.116 These purposes, Goldsworthy
argues, “must be the founders’ original purposes or principles”.117
Spurious implications, which may include spurious unwritten
constitutional principles, are those which “are not really part of the preexisting meaning of a communication, but are added to it by interpreters
in order to improve it in some respect.118 For present purposes, I do not
take a stance on whether the Supreme Court of Canada’s unwritten
constitutional principles are spurious or genuine, in Goldsworthy’s sense.
I only note that some commentators, including Jean LeClair, have argued
that the sources of those principles are not limited to the constitutional
text,119 and therefore, could not be limited to principles that the founders’
themselves held. I believe that for the originalist, LeClair’s point holds
even for unwritten principles, such as federalism, that can be inferred
from constitutional provisions. The Court in the Secession Reference
reasoned that the unwritten principles formed part of the “architecture of
the Constitution” and that “the observance and respect for these
114
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principles is essential to the ongoing process of constitutional
development and evolution of our Constitution as a “living tree”.120 The
very concept of constitutional architecture would seem to represent an
abstraction from the constitutional text that it would be difficult to
characterize as “part of the pre-existing meaning of a communication”.
But even if it could be so characterized, the living tree purpose to which
the Court claims that the principles are to be put would seem to represent
the kind of attempt to “improve” upon that “communication” that
Goldsworthy finds objectionable. When viewed through the lens of this
debate, the Court in Comeau, by appealing to unwritten constitutional
principles, drew on non-originalist sources of constitutional
interpretation.
Third, we have seen above that the living tree doctrine is not
necessarily inconsistent with some forms of originalism, and so the
Court’s invocation of that doctrine should not necessarily be seen as a
rejection of originalism. Yet much turns on how we are to understand the
significance of the Court’s claim that the living tree doctrine asks that
“courts be alert to evolutions in, for example, how we understand
jurisdictional balance and the considerations that animate it”.121 If by
this, the Court simply means that constitutional doctrine can evolve over
time, then the claim would be entirely consistent with how Miller and
Balkin present the contents of constitutional constructions. However,
since the reference to the living tree doctrine precedes the reasons’
interpretation of section 121, I suggest that the Court’s reference to its
“alertness” to evolutions in constitutional understandings is relevant to
how the meaning of that section is to be interpreted, and therefore that it
is tacitly endorsing a non-originalist reading of the Constitution.
Finally, the Court’s reference to the effect of a specific interpretation
of section 121 on “agricultural supply management schemes, public
health-driven prohibitions, environmental controls, and innumerable
comparable regulatory measures” introduces a prudential reason for
declining to enforce the original meaning of the Constitution, if that
meaning were at variance with established precedents. This reason,
namely avoiding the disruption of well-established regulatory regimes,
would be accepted by a living tree constitutionalist as it is unlikely that
such a disruption could be reasonably justified to those who would be
120
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affected by it. And as we have seen above, some originalists are willing
to accommodate pragmatically these kinds of prudential considerations
when interpreting the original meaning of the Constitution and upholding
precedent at variance with it.122
From our assessment of these passages from Comeau, we may
conclude that although the Court’s reasons can be read to align with
original public meaning originalism, there are indications that the Court
is willing to engage in justificatory interpretive exercises that are distant
from standard practices of originalist constitutional interpretation. One
way of rendering these exercises consistent with the original public
meaning approach would be to suggest that they may be pertinent to
those parts of the Constitution — including conventions and doctrinal
rules — that do not bear directly on the interpretation of the Constitution.
I have already noted that this is an implausible way of understanding the
Court’s reference to the living tree doctrine, as that passage addresses the
interpretation of section 121, and not merely its construction. The other
passages I have discussed also addressed that question and so are best
understood as evidencing a non-originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation.
I believe that the better reading sees in these passages evidence of the
Court’s interpretive eclecticism. I have argued elsewhere that
constitutional interpretation is a practice whose rules, including rules
about the relative priority of different approaches to constitutional
interpretation, “cannot be definitively set out in advance”.123 The
discussion above of the normative grounds of the debate between
originalism and living tree constitutionalism suggests why this is the
case. Courts face contending rule of law values and differing conceptions
of constitutional legitimacy when deciding whether to adopt one or the
other of the approaches to constitutional interpretation that we have
considered in this article. Because concepts such as the rule of law and
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constitutional legitimacy are complex and essentially contested,124 it is
unlikely that a constitutional interpreter will in all instances deploy a
single approach to interpretation that understands these concepts through
the lens of that approach, to the exclusion of all other understandings.
Given the complexity of the situations in which courts and others are
called upon to interpret the Constitution, it seems more likely that they
will in some instances draw upon originalism and its privileged values of
settlement and stability, and as a consequence give pride of place to
popular sovereignty as a source of constitutional legitimacy. At other
times, they will call upon living tree constitutionalism’s justificatory
focus, as they seek to vindicate that aspect of the rule of law and
constitutional legitimacy. I believe that it is this openness to eclecticism
that the Court expressed in the passages that we have just considered.
The question remains whether an eclectic approach can be justified.
In their comprehensive survey of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
jurisprudence, which covers the full range of areas of constitutional law,
Sirota and Oliphant note that the Court deploys an array of approaches to
constitutional interpretation, including most notably for their purposes,
originalism.125 Although the authors intend their survey to demonstrate
that originalism is a force to be reckoned with in Canadian constitutional
law, the survey also suggests that eclecticism accurately describes the
state of constitutional interpretation in Canada, across all of its domains.
That description is the basis for a justification of a particular kind.
As we have seen above, constitutional interpretation engages
questions of great normative complexity, in which contending values are
persistently at play. By incorporating the normative commitments of a
variety of approaches to constitutional interpretation, eclecticism
contains within it the range of considerations that the public could
reasonably expect a judge to weigh when making decisions under the
Constitution.126 By contrast, a judge who systematically decided cases
124
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following an approach that gave short shrift to any set of relevant
considerations would deny the public this kind of full justification. Those
subject to this kind of partial decision-making and who disagreed with it
may feel as if their deeply felt commitments were ignored or treated as
mere preferences, unworthy of serious consideration. They may, as a
consequence, feel as if they were reduced to a position of subservience
and that their moral agency was denied.127 It is perhaps in its solicitude
towards and respect for the range of normative commitments in the
constitutional polity that eclecticism finds its ultimate justification.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have sought to situate Comeau in the context of
debates about originalism. I have shown that the Court’s reasoning can
be understood to be consistent with the original public meaning version
of originalism, which Miller has argued Edwards also evinced. I have
further developed, in the Canadian context, Balkin’s suggestion that
originalism is a normative and not simply descriptive approach to
constitutional interpretation, and I have argued that deciding between
originalist and living tree approaches to constitutional interpretation
involves weighing contending normative values. I concluded the
previous Part by identifying and discussing passages that suggest that
although Comeau can be understood to be consistent with original public
meaning originalism, the Court in that case suggested a willingness to
entertain living tree constitutionalist arguments. In my view, this
willingness evidences the Court’s eclectic approach to constitutional
interpretation, its acknowledgment of the range of normative
considerations that are at play in constitutional cases, and its respect for
the diverse moral commitments that are held by members of the
Canadian polity.

the Constitution and the given facts of a case may explain what might otherwise appear to be a
random distribution of interpretive approaches in the Canadian case law.
127
See Dworkin, “Rule of Law” at 152 and the discussion in the accompanying main text.

